A Ramsey Bound on Stable Sets in Jordan Pillage Games

Manfred Kerber; Colin Rowat

doi:10.1007/s00182-010-0247-5

A Ramsey Bound on Stable Sets in Jordan Pillage Games

Manfred Kerber, Colin Rowat

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

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Abstract

Jordan (J Econ Theory 131(1):26-44, 2006) defined 'pillage games', a class of cooperative games whose dominance operator is represented by a 'power function' satisfying coalitional and resource monotonicity axioms. In this environment, he proved that stable sets must be finite. We provide a graph theoretical interpretation of the problem which tightens the finite bound to a Ramsey number. We also prove that the Jordan pillage axioms are independent.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	461-466
Number of pages	6
Journal	International Journal of Game Theory
Volume	40
Issue number	3
Early online date	4 Jul 2010
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-010-0247-5
Publication status	Published - 1 Aug 2011

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10.1007/s00182-010-0247-5

Kerber_Rowat_Ramsey_Bound_Stable_Sets_International_Journal_Game_Theory_2011
The final publication is available at Springer via http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00182-010-0247-5 Eligibility for repository checked June 2015
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Weak Property Rights: Financial Markets and Development
Rowat, C. (Principal Investigator) & Dutta, J. (Co-Investigator)
Economic & Social Research Council
1/04/05 → 31/03/09
Project: Research Councils

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AB - Jordan (J Econ Theory 131(1):26-44, 2006) defined 'pillage games', a class of cooperative games whose dominance operator is represented by a 'power function' satisfying coalitional and resource monotonicity axioms. In this environment, he proved that stable sets must be finite. We provide a graph theoretical interpretation of the problem which tightens the finite bound to a Ramsey number. We also prove that the Jordan pillage axioms are independent.

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A Ramsey Bound on Stable Sets in Jordan Pillage Games

Abstract

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Weak Property Rights: Financial Markets and Development

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