Abstract
I distinguish between two broadly different interpretations of anomalous monism. I then pose problems for both. I argue that one interpretation leads to well known problems concerning epiphenomenalism, whilst the other interpretation is implausible because it fails to give a good account of the role of properties in causation. I then develop a new version of anomalous monism, which can avoid both of these issues. This view draws heavily on the metaphysics of dispositions, as well as work on causation. I conclude that anomalous monism is deserving of a reappraisal.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Title of host publication | Consciousness and the Ontology of Properties |
| Editors | Mihretu Guta |
| Place of Publication | New York |
| Publisher | Routledge |
| Chapter | 3 |
| Pages | 39-52 |
| Number of pages | 14 |
| Edition | 1st |
| ISBN (Electronic) | 9781351598903, 9781315104706 |
| ISBN (Print) | 9781138097865 |
| Publication status | Published - 19 Jul 2018 |
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