TY - JOUR
T1 - A model of conflict and leadership
T2 - Is there a hawkish drift in politics?
AU - Bandyopadhyay, Siddhartha
AU - Chattopadhyay, Amit K
AU - Oak, Mandar
PY - 2022/1/14
Y1 - 2022/1/14
N2 - We analyze conflict between a citizenry and an insurgent group over a fixed resource such as land. The citizenry has an elected leader who proposes a division such that, the lower the land ceded to the insurgents, the higher the cost of conflict. Leaders differ in ability and ideology such that the higher the leader's ability, the lower the cost of conflict, and the more hawkish the leader, the higher his utility from retaining land. We show that the conflict arises from the political process with re-election motives causing leaders to choose to cede too little land to signal their ability. We also show that when the rents of office are high, the political equilibrium and the second best diverge; in particular, the policy under the political equilibrium is more hawkish compared to the second best. When both ideology and ability are unknown, we provide a plausible condition under which the probability of re-election increases in the leader's hawkishness, thereby providing an explanation for why hawkish politicians may have a natural advantage under the electoral process.
AB - We analyze conflict between a citizenry and an insurgent group over a fixed resource such as land. The citizenry has an elected leader who proposes a division such that, the lower the land ceded to the insurgents, the higher the cost of conflict. Leaders differ in ability and ideology such that the higher the leader's ability, the lower the cost of conflict, and the more hawkish the leader, the higher his utility from retaining land. We show that the conflict arises from the political process with re-election motives causing leaders to choose to cede too little land to signal their ability. We also show that when the rents of office are high, the political equilibrium and the second best diverge; in particular, the policy under the political equilibrium is more hawkish compared to the second best. When both ideology and ability are unknown, we provide a plausible condition under which the probability of re-election increases in the leader's hawkishness, thereby providing an explanation for why hawkish politicians may have a natural advantage under the electoral process.
KW - Politics
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85122866958&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1371/journal.pone.0261646
DO - 10.1371/journal.pone.0261646
M3 - Article
C2 - 35030207
SN - 1932-6203
VL - 17
JO - PLoS ONE
JF - PLoS ONE
IS - 1
M1 - e0261646
ER -