Abstract
Industrial Control Systems (ICSs) are computers managing many critical infrastructures like power plants, aeroplanes, production lines, etc. While ICS were specialised hardware circuits without internet connection in former times, they are nowadays commodity computers with network connection, TCP/IP stack, and a full operating system, making them vulnerable to common attacks. The defensive mechanisms, however, are still lacking behind due to the strong requirement for availability of ICSs which prohibits to deploy typical countermeasures like e.g. an anti-virus. New techniques are needed to defend these systems under their distinct prerequisites.
We introduce the concept of a malware-tolerant ICS network architecture which can still operate securely even when some components are entirely compromised by an attacker. This was done by replacing all single pointof-
failures with multiple components verifying each other. We provide ProVerif proofs to show the correctness of the network protocol one-byone assuming each device compromised.
Furthermore, we added a self-healing mechanism based on invariants to the architecture on network as well as system level which will reset failed or compromised systems. To demonstrate system level self-healing, we implemented it on top of FreeRTOS and ARM TrustZone. The network level self-healing was incorporated into the ProVerif proofs by formally verifying the absence of type 1 (falsely identified attacks) and type 2 errors (missed attacks).
We introduce the concept of a malware-tolerant ICS network architecture which can still operate securely even when some components are entirely compromised by an attacker. This was done by replacing all single pointof-
failures with multiple components verifying each other. We provide ProVerif proofs to show the correctness of the network protocol one-byone assuming each device compromised.
Furthermore, we added a self-healing mechanism based on invariants to the architecture on network as well as system level which will reset failed or compromised systems. To demonstrate system level self-healing, we implemented it on top of FreeRTOS and ARM TrustZone. The network level self-healing was incorporated into the ProVerif proofs by formally verifying the absence of type 1 (falsely identified attacks) and type 2 errors (missed attacks).
Original language | English |
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Title of host publication | ICT Systems Security and Privacy Protection |
Subtitle of host publication | 32nd IFIP TC 11 International Conference, SEC 2017, Rome, Italy, May 29-31, 2017, Proceedings |
Editors | Sabrina De Capitani di Vimercati, Fabio Martinelli |
Publisher | Springer |
Pages | 46-60 |
ISBN (Electronic) | 9783319584690 |
ISBN (Print) | 9783319584683 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 22 Jul 2018 |
Event | 32nd International Conference on ICT Systems Security and Privacy Protection (IFIP SEC 2017) - Rome, Italy Duration: 29 May 2017 → 31 May 2017 |
Publication series
Name | IFIP Advances in Information and Communication Technology |
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Publisher | Springer |
Volume | 502 |
ISSN (Print) | 1868-4238 |
ISSN (Electronic) | 1868-422X |
Conference
Conference | 32nd International Conference on ICT Systems Security and Privacy Protection (IFIP SEC 2017) |
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Country/Territory | Italy |
City | Rome |
Period | 29/05/17 → 31/05/17 |
Keywords
- Industrial Control System (ICS)
- Security
- Malware Tolerance
- Self-Healing