A leakage resilient MAC

Daniel P. Martin; Elisabeth Oswald; Martijn Stam; Marcin Wójcik

doi:10.1007/978-3-319-27239-9_18

A leakage resilient MAC

Daniel P. Martin^*, Elisabeth Oswald, Martijn Stam, Marcin Wójcik

^*Corresponding author for this work

Computer Science

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution

Abstract

We put forward the first practical message authentication code (MAC) which is provably secure against continuous leakage under the Only Computation Leaks Information (OCLI) assumption. Within the context of continuous leakage, we introduce a novel modular proof technique: while most previous schemes are proven secure directly in the face of leakage, we reduce the (leakage) security of our scheme to its non-leakage security. This modularity, while known in other contexts, has two advantages: it makes it clearer which parts of the proof rely on which assumptions (i. e. whether a given assumption is needed for the leakage or the non-leakage security) and it also means that, if the security of the non-leakage version is improved, the security in the face of leakage is improved ‘for free’. We conclude the paper by discussing implementations; one on a popular core for embedded systems (the ARM Cortex-M4) and one on a high end processor (Intel i7), and investigate some performance and security aspects.

Original language	English
Title of host publication	Cryptography and Coding - 15th IMA International Conference, IMACC 2015, Proceedings
Editors	Jens Groth
Publisher	Springer Verlag
Pages	295-310
Number of pages	16
ISBN (Print)	9783319272382
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-27239-9_18
Publication status	Published - 2015
Event	15th IMA International Conference on Cryptography and Coding, IMACC 2015 - Oxford, United Kingdom Duration: 15 Dec 2015 → 17 Dec 2015

Publication series

Name	Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
Volume	9496
ISSN (Print)	0302-9743
ISSN (Electronic)	1611-3349

Conference

Conference	15th IMA International Conference on Cryptography and Coding, IMACC 2015
Country/Territory	United Kingdom
City	Oxford
Period	15/12/15 → 17/12/15

Bibliographical note

Funding Information:
Dan Martin and Elisabeth Oswald have been supported in part by EPSRC via grant EP/I005226/1. Marcin Wójcik has been supported by the EU DG Home Affairs - ISEC (Prevention of and Fight against Crime) / INT (Illegal Use of Internet) programme and his research leading to these results has received funding from the European Union’s Seventh Framework Programme (FP7/2007-2013) under grant agreement n 609094. o

Publisher Copyright:
© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2015.

Keywords

Implementation
Leakage resilience
Message authentication code
Provable security
Side channels

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Theoretical Computer Science
General Computer Science

Access to Document

10.1007/978-3-319-27239-9_18

Cite this

Martin, D. P., Oswald, E., Stam, M., & Wójcik, M. (2015). A leakage resilient MAC. In J. Groth (Ed.), Cryptography and Coding - 15th IMA International Conference, IMACC 2015, Proceedings (pp. 295-310). (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics); Vol. 9496). Springer Verlag. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-27239-9_18

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abstract = "We put forward the first practical message authentication code (MAC) which is provably secure against continuous leakage under the Only Computation Leaks Information (OCLI) assumption. Within the context of continuous leakage, we introduce a novel modular proof technique: while most previous schemes are proven secure directly in the face of leakage, we reduce the (leakage) security of our scheme to its non-leakage security. This modularity, while known in other contexts, has two advantages: it makes it clearer which parts of the proof rely on which assumptions (i. e. whether a given assumption is needed for the leakage or the non-leakage security) and it also means that, if the security of the non-leakage version is improved, the security in the face of leakage is improved {\textquoteleft}for free{\textquoteright}. We conclude the paper by discussing implementations; one on a popular core for embedded systems (the ARM Cortex-M4) and one on a high end processor (Intel i7), and investigate some performance and security aspects.",

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note = "Funding Information: Dan Martin and Elisabeth Oswald have been supported in part by EPSRC via grant EP/I005226/1. Marcin W{\'o}jcik has been supported by the EU DG Home Affairs - ISEC (Prevention of and Fight against Crime) / INT (Illegal Use of Internet) programme and his research leading to these results has received funding from the European Union{\textquoteright}s Seventh Framework Programme (FP7/2007-2013) under grant agreement n 609094. o Publisher Copyright: {\textcopyright} Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2015.; 15th IMA International Conference on Cryptography and Coding, IMACC 2015 ; Conference date: 15-12-2015 Through 17-12-2015",

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Martin, DP, Oswald, E, Stam, M & Wójcik, M 2015, A leakage resilient MAC. in J Groth (ed.), Cryptography and Coding - 15th IMA International Conference, IMACC 2015, Proceedings. Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics), vol. 9496, Springer Verlag, pp. 295-310, 15th IMA International Conference on Cryptography and Coding, IMACC 2015, Oxford, United Kingdom, 15/12/15. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-27239-9_18

A leakage resilient MAC. / Martin, Daniel P.; Oswald, Elisabeth; Stam, Martijn et al.
Cryptography and Coding - 15th IMA International Conference, IMACC 2015, Proceedings. ed. / Jens Groth. Springer Verlag, 2015. p. 295-310 (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics); Vol. 9496).

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution

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AU - Martin, Daniel P.

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N1 - Funding Information: Dan Martin and Elisabeth Oswald have been supported in part by EPSRC via grant EP/I005226/1. Marcin Wójcik has been supported by the EU DG Home Affairs - ISEC (Prevention of and Fight against Crime) / INT (Illegal Use of Internet) programme and his research leading to these results has received funding from the European Union’s Seventh Framework Programme (FP7/2007-2013) under grant agreement n 609094. o Publisher Copyright: © Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2015.

PY - 2015

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N2 - We put forward the first practical message authentication code (MAC) which is provably secure against continuous leakage under the Only Computation Leaks Information (OCLI) assumption. Within the context of continuous leakage, we introduce a novel modular proof technique: while most previous schemes are proven secure directly in the face of leakage, we reduce the (leakage) security of our scheme to its non-leakage security. This modularity, while known in other contexts, has two advantages: it makes it clearer which parts of the proof rely on which assumptions (i. e. whether a given assumption is needed for the leakage or the non-leakage security) and it also means that, if the security of the non-leakage version is improved, the security in the face of leakage is improved ‘for free’. We conclude the paper by discussing implementations; one on a popular core for embedded systems (the ARM Cortex-M4) and one on a high end processor (Intel i7), and investigate some performance and security aspects.

AB - We put forward the first practical message authentication code (MAC) which is provably secure against continuous leakage under the Only Computation Leaks Information (OCLI) assumption. Within the context of continuous leakage, we introduce a novel modular proof technique: while most previous schemes are proven secure directly in the face of leakage, we reduce the (leakage) security of our scheme to its non-leakage security. This modularity, while known in other contexts, has two advantages: it makes it clearer which parts of the proof rely on which assumptions (i. e. whether a given assumption is needed for the leakage or the non-leakage security) and it also means that, if the security of the non-leakage version is improved, the security in the face of leakage is improved ‘for free’. We conclude the paper by discussing implementations; one on a popular core for embedded systems (the ARM Cortex-M4) and one on a high end processor (Intel i7), and investigate some performance and security aspects.

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KW - Leakage resilience

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KW - Provable security

KW - Side channels

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DO - 10.1007/978-3-319-27239-9_18

M3 - Conference contribution

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SN - 9783319272382

T3 - Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)

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Martin DP, Oswald E, Stam M, Wójcik M. A leakage resilient MAC. In Groth J, editor, Cryptography and Coding - 15th IMA International Conference, IMACC 2015, Proceedings. Springer Verlag. 2015. p. 295-310. (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)). doi: 10.1007/978-3-319-27239-9_18

A leakage resilient MAC

Abstract

Publication series

Conference

Bibliographical note

Keywords

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Access to Document

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Cite this